The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law develops legal techniques to fight climate change, trains law students and lawyers in their use, and provides the legal profession and the public with up-to-date resources on key topics in climate law and regulation. It works closely with the scientists at Columbia University's Earth Institute and with a wide range of governmental, nongovernmental and academic organizations.
INTRODUCTION
Flooding is the most common and costly form of nature's wrath. 1 On average, flooding causes $50 billion in economic losses each year in the United States.
2 Worse yet, damage and the associated costs are likely to rise as the climate changes and sea levels rise. Many areas will experience increased flood risk, but coastal areas are the most likely to feel dramatic effects. 3 "Virtually certain" sea level rise 4 will lead to greater storm surge (the rise in water level above normal tidal variation 5 ), which will exacerbate coastal flooding. Many of these impacts are already being observed; for example, "the height of a 50-year flood event 6 has increased anywhere from 2 to more than 10 cm per decade since 1970." 7 The federal government has attempted to address flooding through an insurance program aimed at effectively providing relief to those whose property is damaged by flooding and at incentivizing sound risk management. However, the federal insurance program subsidizes flood insurance premiums, and, therefore, If thoughtfully redesigned, the flood insurance regime could be a powerful tool for encouraging sensible coastal land use as we confront the increased danger that climate change poses to these areas. As sea levels rise and storms become more frequent and severe, damage from flooding will increase. A properly constructed insurance regime would ensure that the people affected by this increased flooding pay appropriate insurance premiums. Moreover, such a regime would discourage excess development in floodprone areas in the first place. This paper 8 will begin by exploring the impact that climate change will have on flooding before turning to a description of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the principle focus of this paper. The paper will provide details on the operation and functions of the NFIP and then discuss the ways the regime discourages adaptation to climate change. Finally, the paper will conclude with suggestions for how readers can promote climate change adaptation by advocating for changes to the NFIP. 
BACKGROUND: FLOODING AND CLIMATE CHANGE

THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM
The government has taken many approaches in attempts to reduce the impact of flooding events. 20 The first attempts involved the construction of dams and levees to control rising water. 21 After failing to fully control the danger with infrastructure, in 1968 Congress passed the National Flood Insurance Act (the Act).
The Federal Insurance and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) manages the act under the direction of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which is an agency within the Department of Homeland Security. 22 The Act was passed in response to increasing flood losses, for which the government had to bear much of the cost of responding through disaster relief spending. 23 The legislation sought to control those costs through community floodplain management ordinances and by protecting property with an insurance mechanism based on payment of premiums. 
Community Floodplain Management
The NFIP's community floodplain management requirements are intended to ensure that communities covered by the program are committed to regulating and controlling future development of the floodplain. 25 To participate in the insurance aspect of the program, a building must be part of a community that participates in the program. 26 FEMA regulations define a community as "any State or area or political subdivision thereof, or any Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or Alaska Native village or authorized native organization, which has authority to adopt and enforce floodplain management regulations for the areas within its jurisdiction." 27 To qualify for flood insurance, a community submits an application to 
Insurance
Standard private homeowner and renters' insurance policies do not cover flood related damage, nor do most commercial policies. 33 As a result, before the NFIP was created, the government bore the cost of flood damage to people's homes through disaster relief payments. 34 The NFIP sought to reduce the financial 25 
Coverage
These premiums provide coverage for up to $250,000 in damages to residential buildings, capped at the building's replacement cost, or the amount it would cost to rebuild the structure as it was before the damage. 54 The standard insurance policy covers $100,000 of damage to home contents. 55 Notably there are limitations to the coverage for basements and their contents. 56 Excess flood insurance is available from private insurers for those who desire additional coverage. 57 For commercial buildings, the NFIP is limited to $500,000 for the structure and another $500,000 for the contents.
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Coverage does not take effect immediately after enrollment. To ensure that people do not delay purchasing insurance until flooding is imminent, there is a 30-day waiting period before a purchased policy 47 
PROBLEMS WITH THE NFIP
Subsidized Rates and Insolvency
The two-pronged approach taken by the NFIP was intended to reduce the burden on the public coffers caused by flood related damage. 61 However, premiums paid to support the program have been insufficient to cover payments made to compensate for losses. 62 In large part this is a result of subsidies many buildings receive on their premiums. 63 Premium discounts are given to owners of structures built before FEMA mapped the flood areas as well as to several categories of homeowners. 64 In 2013, roughly 20% of policies received premium discounts worth 55-60% of full risk policies. 65 These discounts were driven by fears that high premiums would dissuade communities from seeking coverage or cause them to abandon economically viable buildings. 66 FEMA conducts an annual Actuarial Rate Review, which attempts to ascertain if the programs' rate structure is "fiscally sound." 67 The 2011 review concluded that, because of discounted premium rates, "it is currently impractical for the NFIP to be actuarially sound in the aggregate." 68 Though the program has undergone several changes recently, as will be discussed below, the program remains on unsustainable fiscal footing.
Several factors compound this fiscal insolvency. First, the premiums do not reflect the actual risk of loss, but instead reflect the "hydrologic method 69 of estimating flood damage risk." 70 This model is supposed to cover at least the "historic average loss year," 71 calculated by averaging the amount of damage in all previous years. Thus, when extreme storms cause record-setting damages, the historic average should rise, thereby increasing the premiums required to cover the expected losses. 72 Premium increases sufficient to keep the NFIP solvent have, however, proved politically unsupportable. 73 Therefore, the cost of recent extreme flooding events, including those caused by Hurricane Katrina and other severe storms, has not been fully factored in to the historic average loss year and is not adequately reflected in current premium rates. 74 Moreover, Congress withheld from FEMA permission to account for the effects of climate change and related phenomena in its risk maps despite the development of scientific models predicting climate change impacts. 75 Instead, rates are determined by incomplete historical data and ignore the future effects of rising sea levels. 76 Consequently, the NFIP paid out more in claims following Hurricane Katrina than it had over the entire span of the program up to that point. 77 With insufficient funds to cover these costs, Congress was forced to raise FEMA's borrowing authority to $20.775 billion. 78 Congress again raised FEMA's borrowing limit, this time to $30 billion, in the wake of Hurricane Sandy. 
High Risk Development
Damage from flooding is rising in part due to increased development and property values within the floodplain. As extreme storm events are becoming more frequent, coastal communities are undergoing rapid growth. 80 Between 1970 and 2010, the population living in coastal watershed areas exploded by 45% or 50.9 million people. 81 The presence of valuable property directly in the paths of these devastating storms has increased the amount of damage caused by such storms. Indeed, coastal development has swelled in the last few decades due to the NFIP and other regimes that incentivize and subsidize development along coastlines and in floodplains. People considering moving into flood-prone areas determine that they can safely do so because the risks associated with those areas are offset by federally funded insurance. As a result, increasing numbers of people move into those areas. The problem arises because the insurance regime is not able to cover the costs of damage suffered by people moving into those areas, since premiums are insufficient to cover the risk.
Worse yet, the costs associated with flooding are increasing dramatically with climate change. 91 When these mapping efforts are implemented, they will more accurately account for risk by using data that more realistically reflects the risk of future flooding.
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Biggert-Waters also ended the process of grandfathering under which homeowners were able to keep their old premiums despite being classified as higher risk on a new map. 93 Perhaps most significantly, the statute clarified that catastrophic loss years must be included in the calculation of average losses, thus including the costs of storms like Katrina in the calculation. 94 The statute also increased the amount that premiums could be increased annually from 10% to 20%. 95 Additionally, those who had not previously had a policy but were classified into SFHAs by the required mapping updates, including properties purchased 84 Id. at 4002(a)(1). 85 Kousky, supra note 64, at 3. 86 grandfathering 100 and lowered the cap on premium increases. 101 It also repealed measures requiring escalation to full risk rates for homeowners who were not previously covered. 102 Additionally, the law required the FEMA administrator to appoint an Advocate to argue for the fair treatment of policyholders.
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Collectively these measures eliminate or delay many of the Biggert-Waters Act's commendable attempts to reform the NFIP. 104 However, the provisions concerning the consideration of sea level rise in flood mapping survived and remain in effect.
HOW THE NFIP COULD BE MADE EFFECTIVE
The question of how to reform flood insurance to promote climate change adaptation is part of a larger debate on how society can fairly change long standing legal regimes that incentivize land use patterns with potentially negative effects. Everything from subsidized crop insurance to water subsidies in drought-prone regions will have to be reevaluated in light of changing climate conditions. Changes to the NFIP raise significant questions of fairness including contractual obligations and constitutional questions regarding regulatory takings. Nonetheless, certain changes remain feasible and necessary.
Complete elimination of flood insurance subsidies or even reductions in the level of subsidization would require homeowners to shoulder the risk of building in a flood-prone area. Better decision-making would result if homeowners are required to pay the premiums necessary to support a self-sufficient insurance program, since the higher costs would force homeowners to more thoroughly consider the potential ramifications of living in a high flood risk area. This section explains how the reader can support reformation of the NFIP to promote climate change adaptation. It provides a list of potential reforms and describes pathways for promoting those reforms through congressional and agency processes.
Possible Reforms
The following reforms to the NFIP would help promote climate change adaptation:
105  Mapping should be protected from political influence. It is essential that flood risk maps reflect actual flood risk and that risk estimates are not tempered by political considerations. Otherwise, premiums will not be sufficient to cover the amount the NFIP is required to pay those who experience floods.  Subsidies should be phased out. Since subsidies allow people to pay less than the amount required for the program to remain solvent, and because subsidized premiums encourage development in flood prone areas, subsidies must be phased out.  Climate Change should be explicitly considered. Climate change must be included in flood risk calculations by both officials and the public. Thus, extreme storm events and climate change projections should be included in the calculation of premiums.
Congressional Action
Concerned citizens and organizations can promote climate change adaptation by advocating for the reforms to NFIP described above. Flood insurance measures being considered by Congress can be found at https://www.congress.gov/ by simply typing "flood insurance" into the search bar. Proposed measures pass through committees tasked with exploring specific issues; it is at this stage that they usually receive the most thorough consideration.
Committees relevant to a specific piece of legislation will be identified on congress.gov, and you can find contact information for relevant congresspersons at usa.gov as mentioned above. Committees working in these issues include the House Committee on Financial Services, through which the Affordability Act passed, 107 and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, which considered a Senate version of the legislation. 108 
